Multimedialne seminarium z ekono- i socjofizyki

We consider the two-player general coordination game [1] described by a payoff matrixwith two parameters. It contains a socialdilemma -- the most rewarding outcome is obtained if bothplayers choose the same strategy, but there is a hidden trade offbetween security and profit. The highest possible profit is madewhen both play the payoff-dominantor Pareto-optimal strategy. On the other hand, the risk-dominant strategyis the best choice in the lack of knowledge, i.e. it is the strategy thatresults in the highest average payoff assuming that the opponentwill play either way with the same probability.We study a population of players participating in two games ontwo inter-connected layers.A given node can be present on both layersor only on one of them. If it is present on both, it plays the samestrategy everywhere. The fraction of nodes shared between the layersis controlled by the node overlap parameter. Players on each layer are engaged in different games, i.e. parametersdefining the payoff matrix have different valueson each layer. In order to give the same relevance to both layers,their preferences towards one of the equilibria are set to beequally strong, thereforegames are truly symmetrical.In our multilayer model, which strategy is risk-dominantdepends on the layer, but coordination on the Pareto-optimal strategy prevailsin most of the parameters space or is at least favoured on average.This symmetry breaking is a clear indication that the multilayer structureenhances the Pareto-optimal outcome and it does so ina complex manner.[1] Tomasz Raducha, Maxi San Miguel. "Coordination and equilibrium selection in games: the role of local effects." Scientific reports 12.1 (2022): 1-16. join us via zoomhttps://us02web.zoom.us/j/82025295160?pwd=Rno0Skx6Q3haRzVzZy90dkRrbmxQQT09Meeting ID: 820 2529 5160Passcode: 794269